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Eurozone ﬁnance ministers met on Tuesday to discuss the Greek debt crisis following the country’s
‘No’ vote in its bailout referendum on 5 July. Lorenzo Codogno writes that while a Grexit remains
unlikely, the risks have clearly increased since the referendum and the ﬁnancial and economic
situation in Greece may further deteriorate before a solution is in sight.
Following the ‘No’ vote in the Greek referendum, there is deep uncertainty over what the possible
scenarios are now for Greece. This article addresses some of the key questions prompted by the
result. Firstly, what was the referendum all about? The question was certainly not easy to interpret
for the average Greek voter, but the overall message was clear. On paper, it was a vote on the creditors’ ﬁnancing
package. More broadly, it was a conﬁdence vote on the Greek government and its attitude in the negotiations with
creditors and towards the conditionality required on Greece to get ﬁnancial support. At face value, however, it was
not a referendum on the euro.
From this perspective, the referendum was useless
and probably counterproductive, but it raised
fundamental issues. In fact, while the vote has
immediate practical implications, it is also a soul-
searching exercise for Europe, what it stands for,
what kind of governance is the most appropriate for
the future.
Countries must give up sovereignty as they enter
monetary union, and it will become even truer as the
Eurozone moves toward ‘ever closer integration’.
Moreover, the current governance implies an
incremental withdrawal of sovereignty as a country
proceeds into a formal infringement procedure,
implements a Memorandum of Understanding and
gets ﬁnancing. A country cannot impose its own rules
at the expense of the others, especially if it has a
very high debt versus the rest of the Eurozone.
The current debate goes far beyond the Greek
situation. It goes straight to the heart of what European integration is all about, and thus it will have long-lasting
implications for the future of the Eurozone. This reasoning would lead me to a long discussion, while the purpose of
this commentary is to pinpoint possible near-term developments.
What next?
At face value, a ‘no’ vote does automatically translate into plain rejection of the last-ditch bailout oﬀer by Greece’s
creditors. However, things may be more complex than that for a number of reasons. First, the text submitted to the
referendum was already obsolete as negotiations had advanced in the meantime. Tsipras said he would head
straight to Brussels if he gets a ‘no’ vote and he is expected to present proposals later today. Even more important
than the vote, however, is the political reaction in Eurozone capitals, and especially in Berlin. If the attitude remains
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constructive, proper negotiations will now resume, but time is of the essence here as the ﬁnancial/economic situation
in Greece is deteriorating fast.
Second, the fact that just over 61 per cent of Greek voters voted ‘no’ cannot be totally dismissed in Brussels and in
the other European countries, but the starting point of fresh negotiations is likely to be the end-point of the previous
ones. My guess is that creditors will initially be unwilling to change much with respect to the latest oﬀer. They have
made it perfectly clear that further debt relief will be on oﬀer only once Greece implements the programme. This is
unlikely to have changed with the referendum. It is a sensible attempt to reward good behaviour and, if anything, this
stance may have hardened.
Third, it is not clear whether there will be any room for further concessions by Eurozone governments with their
taxpayers’ money (they have democratic mandates to honour as well) simply because Greek voters want them to do
so. Tsipras has already completely lost trust among the creditors, and thus now he has a much more diﬃcult task.
Fourth, there will likely be a need for some bridge ﬁnancing to avoid an immediate collapse of the Greek ﬁnancial
system and this may prove particularly diﬃcult. The Greek government will have to conﬁrm the closure of Greek
banks and maybe even introduce IOUs or promissory notes for a while. Negotiations will likely take more than a few
days.
Is the current programme suitable?
My guess is that the programme tabled by the Eurogroup on 25 June (voted at the referendum) will become
substantially diﬀerent over the next few days. It is apparent by now that the programme is inadequate to address the
fundamental issues facing Greece. In particular, it has a short-term approach (understandably so, given the lack of
trust with regards to the ability of the Greek government to deliver); it does not address the long-term ﬁnancing issue
of the economy (these needs would call for a 10-20 year “Marshall Plan” for Greece); it is heavily skewed towards
higher revenues (given the Greek government’s stance on spending cuts), which would not help Greece’s economic
recovery; it does not properly acknowledge the issue of aggregate demand (even the IMF is now fully on board with
this); and there is no attempt to provide any form of debt relief (creditors are unlikely to give Greece the beneﬁt of the
doubt, especially after the outcome of the vote), but the commitment should be clearly spelled out.
Can a butterﬂy in Brazil cause a tornado in Texas?
The knee-jerk reaction by ﬁnancial markets is likely to continue to be negative. Government bond spreads could
easily widen sharply. This also depend on the signals coming from Athens: when the noise is conciliatory, with a
constructive attitude in ﬁnding an agreed solution, the widening of spreads may well prove temporary. However, if
the perceived probability of Grexit increases, the widening of spreads and market turbulence may become more
pronounced.
In ﬁnancial markets, a butterﬂy in Brazil can cause a tornado in Texas. This event is more than just a butterﬂy and
the tornado can easily spread to a substantially larger area. Danes rejected the Maastricht Treaty in the 2 June 1992
referendum with a tiny 50.7 per cent majority. It was widely perceived as a blow to the process of European
integration (and, for a short while, indeed it was). It was suﬃcient to trigger the currency turmoil in 1992-1993. Since
then, issues relating to European integration have been subject to greater scrutiny.
The current situation is more delicate for Europe than the one back in 1992 and the sense of uneasiness for the
European integration process more pronounced. Moreover, the social and political backlash of the ﬁnancial and
economic crisis in Europe has brought to the fore explicit opposition to European integration both in core Europe
and in the periphery. For instance, I was shocked to see that, according to a poll, 49 per cent of Italians would vote
‘no’ to the Greek referendum. Far-left and far-right populism is on the rise almost everywhere in Europe. The whole
confrontation with Greece may have far-reaching political consequences. There could be political contagion in the
rest of Europe.
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Aside from this, however, it is diﬃcult to see any mechanical channel through which contagion could spread in
ﬁnancial markets. The referendum was widely debated and ﬁnancial markets were prepared for the possibility of a
‘no’ vote. In other words, the surprise outcome of the vote was not totally unexpected (while the Greek decision to
call for a referendum was a genuine surprise). The Greek exposure is almost entirely towards other European
countries and international institutions, which could more easily absorb losses. As a result, there is limited risk of
setting in motion a spiral of ﬁnancial problems that leads to widespread changes in economic agents’ behaviour.
This is particularly true for the European banking sector and institutional investors.
In case of default also of the private side and/or exit from monetary union, the banking sector in Greece would de-
facto be insolvent and it would have to be recapitalised. Still, the international exposure to the Greek banking sector
looks limited and unlikely to trigger widespread contagion (Greek banks are present in some other countries, notably
in Bulgaria, Serbia, Romania and Turkey). To some extent, a default in Puerto Rico would produce much larger
contagion as most of its debt is in the market.
What can the ECB do?
In the short term, the heavy lifting will have to come from the ECB. The ECB is expected to front-load asset
purchases undertaken as part of its quantitative easing programme should ﬁnancial markets drive up government
bond spreads across Europe. It could easily double or triple, or even buy a multiple of its usual daily amounts of
bonds bought under the programme. The recent move to broaden the set of assets the ECB can buy is to be
considered as part of the attempt to increase its ammunitions.
Speciﬁcally on Greece, I doubt there will be any possibility for ELA extension before any political decision. The ECB
could provide technical assistance to the Bank of Greece for managing the liquidity situation, but I ﬁnd it diﬃcult to
believe that it can provide any ﬁnancing before a political green light. Moreover, if a solution is not found by 20 July
and Greece defaults on the ECB, even the current stock of ELA extended to the Greek banks will have to be
reconsidered. In case turbulence continues, the ECB has a clear mandate to preserve ﬁnancial stability and
singleness of monetary union, and thus other tools may be introduced.
Can the situation generate much-needed clariﬁcation within Europe?
Some people argue that this Greek saga may lead to signiﬁcant steps toward integration in the Eurozone, a speed-
up in the ever closer integration. I doubt it. Since the European political elections in May 2014, there has been a
clear shift in sentiment toward Europe and the appetite for “more Europe” is probably at historical lows.
In my view, the only signiﬁcant step that in the near future could prevent the spreading of tensions to other Eurozone
countries would be an unlimited insurance on the denomination of bank deposits across the Eurozone. In other
words, European institutions would not guarantee the banks but the denomination of deposits to avoid future
potential bank runs. Never say never, especially if the situation worsens signiﬁcantly. Yet, politically the situation
does not look mature for any sizeable step toward more Europe, not even in the technical domain of economic
governance or deposit insurance.
Nevertheless, such an extreme event would justify a deep soul-searching exercise over the coming months. I think
this exercise is badly needed and it may eventually turn into a renewed commitment and a fresh relaunch of the
integration process. But it will take time.
Bottom line: down but not out
Financial markets are braced for signiﬁcant tensions. The ECB has the tools to prevent contagion in the near term,
but any step to provide liquidity support to Greece can only happen with political blessing. Grexit remains unlikely,
but the risks have clearly increased. It would represent permanent damage to monetary union. European leaders will
work on a solution over the coming days to prevent Grexit by seeking a reasonable compromise with the Greek
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government.
Time plays against the Greek government. It may take at least a few days and the ﬁnancial/economic situation in
Greece may further deteriorate before a solution is in sight. The immediate negative reaction by ﬁnancial markets
may prove short-lived if an agreement is eventually reached.
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